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COLONIAL INFORMANTS AND THE ACEHNESE-DUTCH WAR
Haji Hasan Mustapa’s response to Teuku Umar’s collaboration
with the Dutch authorities in the East Indies
Jajang A. Rohmana
ABSTRACT
This article discusses the contribution of colonial informants during
the Acehnese-Dutch war (1873–c.1912) in responding to Teuku
Umar’s collaboration with the Dutch authorities. The object of this
study is a collection of letters from the Chief Penghulu of Kutaraja
(1893–1895), Haji Hasan Mustapa, to his colonial friend, C. Snouck
Hurgronje. These letters are held at the Leiden University Library
(Cod. Or. 18.097). Hasan Mustapa’s name is rarely mentioned in
studies of the Acehnese-Dutch war. He constantly provided
information relating to the war to Snouck Hurgronje who was
living in Batavia at the time. This study confirms that Hasan
Mustapa’s position was significant in gaining information about
Teuku Umar’s collaboration with the Dutch authorities. Hasan
Mustapa acquired information from both Acehnese informants and
Dutch officials, and believed that Teuku Umar could not be
trusted. Hasan Mustapa’s information on Teuku Umar was
important for Snouck Hurgronje’s advice to the Dutch authorities
in the East Indies. This is therefore a study on the closeness of
informants and their patrons during colonial times in the East
Indies archipelago.
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Early sources mention the importance of Aceh as a place of cultural and commercial
contact with other communities in the world (Feener 2011: 1). Aceh was called the
‘Veranda of Mecca’, and is one of the most studied regions in Indonesia. Many aspects
of Aceh have been extensively investigated, including perspectives of political history,
as well as social, intellectual, and anthropological studies, and thus Aceh seems over-ana-
lysed compared to other regions of the Indonesian archipelago (Azra 2010: vii).
One of the most important periods in Aceh’s history is the Acehnese-Dutch war
(1873––c.1912). It is one of the three most influential national events in Acehnese con-
sciousness; the others being the golden age of Sultan Iskandar Muda in the 17th century,
and the national revolution in 1945 (Reid 1990: 164). The war between the Acehnese and
the Dutch government resulted in a high number of casulties as well as being very costly.
According to Abdullah, Aceh lost almost 4% of its population.1 The war had an
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1Whilst Abdullah (1987) does not provide the Acehnese death toll in numbers, other scholars such as McFate (2018)
provide figures ranging from 75,000 deaths or 15% of the population, to 100,000 (Raben 2012).
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important role in laying the foundations for the struggle of Acehnese identity, and deter-
mining the boundaries of the Indonesian state (Abdullah 1987: 9).
The Dutch authorities employed many intrigues and strategies to win the Aceh war.
One major figure was the most important Dutch advisor, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje
(1857–1936), who was assigned to report on Aceh’s resistance to Dutch authority (Benda
1958: 340–341; Carvalho 2010; van Niel 1957: 593; Steenbrink 1995; Suminto 1996).
Snouck Hurgronje’s book, De Atjehers (1893–94), describes his deep knowledge of
Aceh (Kaptein and van der Meij 1995: 18; Snouck Hurgronje 1906).
Snouck Hurgronje criticised the Dutch colonial policy through his controversial view-
points (Wertheim 1972: 320). He argued that the religious scholars (ulamas) played an
important role in mobilising the people to fight against the Dutch authorities which
was supported undoubtedly by the Acehnese. There could be only one policy, namely
to control the Acehnese through weapons. The Dutch authorities were not to make
contact with the ulamas before they surrendered. Therefore, Snouck Hurgronje suggested
that the Dutch authorities isolate the ulamas who were involved in the war. Additionally,
they should also support those who trusted the colonial authorities and acknowledged
Dutch sovereignty, by helping them expand their influence and power (Alfian 1987:
25–26). Snouck Hurgronje’s presence in Aceh marked the culmination of Dutch colonial
strategy in dealing with the Acehnese. His policy succeeded in controlling the uleebalang
(traditional leaders) and suppressing the ulamas until the end of the Aceh war (Missbach
2010: 39–62; Siegel 1969: 9). Van ‘t Veer (1985: 154) called this approach two aspects of
the same phenomenon, namely ‘ethical policies’ as well as imperialism. Snouck Hur-
gronje proposed a form of ‘policy science’ by seeking an appropriate answer to the pol-
itical problems of Aceh based on his knowledge (Alfian 1987: 26).
However, despite the infinite numbers of published sources on the Aceh war and
Snouck Hurgronje’s contribution, there are few studies which discuss the role of his
informants and helpers when he lived in Kutaraja (Aceh Besar). Snouck Hurgronje
himself admitted the importance of indigenous colleagues in his official reports (van
Koningsveld 1990: lvi). For example, Do Karim, an Acehnese poet, who was an oral
source of Hikayat Prang Kompeuni, the story of the Dutch colonial war, had provided
information on his relations with the ulamas and uleebalang, that was crucial for
Snouck Hurgronje’s reports (van ‘t Veer 1985: 153).
Snouck Hurgronje had also received much information from Raden Aboe Bakar Dja-
jadiningrat (1854–1914), an employee of the Dutch consulate, while living in Jeddah and
Mecca in 1884–1885. Aboe Bakar and other locals supplied useful information about the
Jāwah community in Mecca to Snouck Hurgronje. Aboe Bakar then witnessed Snouck
Hurgronje convert to Islam and accompanied him to Mecca (Witkam 2007a: xvii;
2007b: 20). In addition, Aboe Bakar’s work Tarājim ‘ulamā’ al-jāwah, the biography
of ulamas of the Jāwah community,2 was very useful in completing Snouck Hurgronje’s
great work,Mekka, although he was not credited in the book. This was a power relation-
ship in which Orientalist studies in general depended on the crucial assistance of local
informants whose value is fully recognised only by the Orientalist scholars themselves
(Laffan 1999: 538). The identities of the informants were usually not disclosed. Colonial
2This community refers to Muslims from Southeast Asia covering the Malay Peninsula, East Indies, south Thailand and
Mindanao in the Philippines.
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officials were often worried when there was no forthcoming information from infor-
mants, though some like Snouck Hurgronje claimed to know their subjects thoroughly
and ‘far better than local officials or “native friends”’ (Dirks 1993: 279–313; Laffan
2003a: 85).
Another informant of Snouck Hurgronje who was almost forgotten, particularly in the
Acehnese-Dutch war, was Haji Hasan Mustapa (1852–1930). He was a Sundanese
appointed by the Dutch Governor-General to serve as the Chief Penghulu of Kutaraja
(February 1893–September 1895), based on the recommendation of Snouck Hurgronje.
The penghulu (or pangulu) was the government official responsible for Islamic affairs.
Some scholars (e.g. Alfian 1987, Madjid 2014, Said 1981, van ‘t Veer 1985), who have ana-
lysed the Aceh war failed to mention HasanMustapa. The period between 1893 and 1895,
when Teuku Umar officially collaborated with the Dutch authorities, has been less
studied by these scholars compared to other periods of the Aceh war. It is interesting
that Teuku Umar began his collaboration with the Dutch authorities in September
1893, six months after Hasan Mustapa arrived in Kutaraja. Three years later in March
1896, Teuku Umar terminated his treaty with the Dutch, though Hasan Mustapa left
Kutaraja to return to Bandung in September 1895, several months before the treaty
was abrogated.
Hasan Mustapa reported to Snouck Hurgronje in 45 letters written in Arabic3 during
the almost three years that the former lived in Aceh. Arabic was chosen to maintain
confidentiality as there were few people who were fluent in it (Hisyam 2001: 96).
Hasan Mustapa’s letters were written during the third phase of the Acehnese-Dutch
war (1884–1896) when the uleebalang and Teuku Umar were allies of the Dutch coloni-
alists (1893–1896). Ajip Rosidi (1989: 30) stated that the discovery of Hasan Mustapa’s
letters to Snouck Hurgronje was expected to reveal the former’s role in influencing the
Dutch colonial policy in Aceh. Hasan Mustapa wrote to Snouck Hurgronje almost
weekly, and the letters gave crucial information on the Aceh war, including the role of
the ulamas and uleebalang (van Koningsveld 1989: 28; 1990: xlix).
The significance of Hasan Mustapa’s letters was also recognised by van Koningsveld as
a useful source of comparison with Snouck Hurgronje’s reports advising the Dutch auth-
orities, that were published by Gobée and Adriaanse (van Koningsveld 1990: xiii, liv).
Van Koningsveld noted the importance of Hasan Mustapa’s contribution as he was an
indigenous official who supplied information to the Dutch advisor. It was information
that was ‘quite neutral’ rather than relying on both the Dutch authorities and the Aceh-
nese sources involved in the war. Therefore, it would be difficult for anyone with an inter-
est in studying Aceh and the influence of Hasan Mustapa on Snouck Hurgronje to only
refer to the works of Gobée and Adriaanse. In addition, while Snouck Hurgronje resided
in Aceh between July 1891 and February 1892 and was able to follow closely the many
events in Aceh, he was not there for a significant period and relied on Hasan Mustapa’s
letters. Therefore, the correspondence between Snouck Hurgronje and Hasan Mustapa
would be suitable for further investigation and publication (van Koningsveld 1990:
lvi–lvii).
Hasan Mustapa’s knowledge cannot be separated from the colonial socio-religious
policy within the framework of patron-client relationships. The relationship issue was
3All the letters are stored at Leiden University Library (Cod. Or. 18.097 S.9 and S.16).
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a deep contact between the colonial culture and its colony (Said 1975: 277–278; 1994:
200). This study is significant in highlighting what Laffan (2003b) called the layer of
local information in the ocean of Dutch East Indies documentation. This layer gives
insight to the process of construction of the nation which later became known as
Indonesia.
Hasan Mustapa, Snouck Hurgronje and Teuku Umar
Hasan Mustapa’s appointment as Chief Penghulu of Kutaraja (1893–1895) during the
third phase of the Aceh war (1884–1896), was made after the enforcement of civil admin-
istration in Aceh (1881–1884). This was a period when war was resumed by the Dutch
authorities after the 1881 ceasefire. The Dutch began to take defensive measures in
shaping the civilian government by confining themselves to Aceh Besar in 1884, and
placing military posts in Kutaraja. The Dutch Parliament were then able to reduce oper-
ating costs and rely only on the navy, while offensive action was still carried out along the
coastal territories (Snouck Hurgronje 1906: xi).
Between 1892 and 1896, the post of Dutch civil and military governor of Aceh was
held by C. Deijkerhoff, while that of Dutch Governor-General in Batavia was held by
C.H.A. van der Wijck who had been appointed in 1893 (Regeerings Almanak 1893:
214). It was a period when the Dutch East Indies government changed its relationship
with the Acehnese, by labelling them as ‘insurgents’. The leaders of the insurgency
during this third period of the war were the religious scholars (ulamas). The uleebalang
as traditional leaders had largely been subdued by Dutch authorities. Therefore, this war
was increasingly considered a jihad (holy war) or prang sabi under the leadership of the
ulamas and the mujahideen, as the defenders of faith (Abdullah 1987: 9–10).
The appointment of a penghulu before 1882 was completely dependent on the policy
of the ruler. Anyone who was considered to have expertise in Islamic law could be chosen
as a penghulu. The other considerations were experience in administration, and loyalty to
the colonial authorities. After 1882, the office of penghulu was incorporated into the colo-
nial administration. Thus the recruitment of penghulu and the members of raad agama
(religious councils) began to be under the control of the Dutch administration. The office
of the Advisor on Native Affairs, of which Snouck Hurgronje was the first incumbent,
played an important role in the recruitment of a penghulu (Hisyam 2001: 42–44).
Hasan Mustapa’s appointment as the Chief Penghulu of Kutaraja was recommended
by Snouck Hurgronje. The certificate of decision or besluit of his appointment as
penghulu was dated 13 January 1893, No. 23 (Jahroni 1999: 24). Snouck Hurgronje
had confidence in Hasan Mustapa because he considered Hasan Mustapa competent
in Islamic law and Sundanese customs (Millie 2017: 1–23; Solomon 1986). The appoint-
ment of a Sundanese to serve as an official outside of Java was unusual. Some scholars,
like J.J. van de Velde (1931), have questioned if the position of the Chief Penghulu in
Aceh existed. There was no other penghulu appointed by the Dutch in such a way
before or after him. It was not until 1919 that a more regular colonial office for handling
religious affairs was established by the Dutch in Aceh, and even then, it was rather
different from the office of the penghulu as it had developed in colonial Java and
Madura (Hisyam 2001: 95). The appointment of Hasan Mustapa was a colonial effort
to improve the peace in a region known to be a trouble spot. It is reasonable to say
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that before peace could be realised, the most essential prerequisite was to gain an under-
standing of the socio-cultural aspects of the Acehnese.
The native official position opened a new world for Hasan Mustapa. His new status as
the Chief Penghulu of Kutaraja involved him in Dutch colonial administration. He was
also responsible for Islamic religious affairs in Kutaraja. His office was influential in sup-
plying information on the prevailing situation in Aceh for Snouck Hurgronje who was
living in Batavia. Snouck Hurgronje was in Aceh a year before Hasan Mustapa’s
arrival and for less than eight months. This was insufficient time to keep an eye on the
political situation in Aceh without an informant. Hasan Mustapa, as one of Snouck Hur-
gronje’s informants, had an important role in bridging the interests of Snouck Hurgronje
and the Dutch authorities in the Aceh region (Ali 2017: 141–159).
After arriving in Kutaraja, Hasan Mustapa was on good terms with many people,
including Dutch officials, ulamas, uleebalang, immigrants, and ordinary Acehnese. He
was also friendly with the Dutch civil and military Governor of Aceh, Deijkerhoff,
who served from 1892 to 1896; the Resident of Aceh van Langen; Assistant Resident
of Aceh Besar C.A. Kroesen; Aceh Prosecutor Muhammad Arif; and some controllers
as well as other figures. Hasan Mustapa also met teungku,4 uleebalang and several
people who were prominent figures in Aceh such as Teuku Umar (1854–1899),
Teungku Brahim, Chik Umar, Teuku Nek, Habib Abas (son-in-law of Habib ‘Abdurrah-
man Al-Zahir), Do Karim, Teungku Yakub, Nya’mad Olele, and Amin Jadawi. He
obtained a variety of information which was then reported back to Snouck Hurgronje.
An important focus in Hasan Mustapa’s letters to Snouck Hurgronje was on the most
famous figure in Aceh, Teuku Umar, when he collaborated with the Dutch.
Teuku Umar, an intelligent Acehnese warrior caused controversy in Aceh because of
his collaboration with Dutch authorities. He officially declared his loyalty to the Dutch in
September 1893. As a result, Teuku Umar received various privileges such as the title of
Teuku Johan Pahlawan, the right to have his own soldiers, weapons, office fees, and
houses (Alfian 1987: 82–83). He had previously fought alongside the Acehnese forces
of Sultan Muhammad Daud Syah (1874–1904), Tuanku Hasyim, Teungku Kutakarang
(d.1895), Panglima Polém, Cut Nyak Dien (1850–1908), and Teungku Muhammad
Amin Di Tiro (d.1896), who was the son of Teungku Sheikh Muhammad Saman Di
Tiro (1836–1891). On a previous occasion, Teuku Umar had defied the Dutch in the
case of holding the ship Hok Canton for ransom on 14 June 1886.5 The Dutch civil
and military Governor of Aceh, H.K.F. van Teijn, began to make advances to Teuku
Umar in January 1888 (Kamajaya 1981: 30).
Teuku Umar was in a difficult position when he switched to the Dutch colonial side.
On the one hand, he gained the trust of the next governor of Aceh, Deijkerhoff. On the
other hand, he was opposed by the leaders of the Acehnese troops such as Teungku
Muhammad Amin Di Tiro (henceforth Teungku Amin), and even his wife, Cut Nyak
Dien, considered him a traitor. Teungku Kutakarang, a highly respected religious
4Teungku is an Acehnese title for an ulama whereas Teuku denotes a traditional leader (uleebalang).
5This incident occurred when the European merchant ship, Hok Canton, was detained by Teuku Umar who also had per-
sonal issues with Mevrouw Hansen, the captain of the ship. Teuku Umar’s rival Teuku Imeum of Teunom had also pre-
viously received ransom for the ship Nisero in 1883. Teuku Umar as the most respected warlord in Aceh resisted Dutch
authority amid the competition between the Netherlands in Sumatra and Britain in Melaka to control the pepper trade
(Reid 2005: 282–283).
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scholar in Aceh, had previously declared that the area of Aceh occupied by the Dutch was
a war zone (dār al-ḥarb). Therefore, those who assisted the Dutch were viewed as infidels.
Tuanku Hasyim, the Sultan’s advisor, also stressed that those Acehnese who helped the
Dutch could be justifiably killed (Hadi 2011: 194).
Figure 1. Risālah wal’ah al-nārīn fī waq’ah al-dūrīn, the treatise on the flames of the durian incident.
Source: Cod. Or. 18.097 S.16.2.020-021. Arabic letters from Haji Hasan Mustapa from Kutaraja (corre-
spondence with Snouck Hurgronje), 1893–1895, 19 July 1893. Courtesy of University of Leiden Library.
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There was also pressure on Teuku Umar from the Dutch as he did not have the full
confidence of all the Dutch officials. He was continuously scrutinised by some Dutch
officials and distrusted, especially by the Dutch East Indies military commander,
General J.A. Vetter. Only Deijkerhoff fully believed in Teuku Umar but on 30 March
1896, Teuku Umar finally turned on the Dutch when he attacked them, and kept this ani-
mosity to the end of his life (Bakker 1993: 57; Said 1981: 199).
Many scholars have studied the role of Teuku Umar. The Acehnese and the Indone-
sian governments have both praised him as a national hero from Aceh. His collaboration
with the Dutch authorities was not through despair or surrender, but a strategy to gain
the trust of the Dutch authorities till he was made the Great Commander in Aceh by the
Dutch (Damhoeri 1939: 33; Sofyan 1977: 157). However, Dutch officials and scholars
such as Snouck Hurgronje (1906, I: xii) were wary of him and considered him untrust-
worthy and an opportunist. Another scholar (Kitzen 2012: 93), argued that the Dutch
authorities succeeded in co-opting Teuku Umar but failed to control him. It is an experi-
ence of colonialism that shows the dynamics, advantages and dangers of collaborating
with local rulers who play ‘between treaty and treason’ (Kitzen 2012).
This study describes another side of Teuku Umar as seen from the Sundanese perspec-
tive. Hasan Mustapa when he was the Chief Penghulu of Kutaraja did not fully trust
Teuku Umar either. Hasan Mustapa met and spoke with Teuku Umar on several
occasions, and understood Teuku Umar’s position quite well. He often received infor-
mation on Teuku Umar from Acehnese informants such as Teungku Brahim, Chik
Umar, and Habib Abas, to clarify his own assumptions. He reported in his letters to
Snouck Hurgronje all activities relating to Teuku Umar, his own efforts to gather infor-
mation from Acehnese informants, and his opinion of Teuku Umar. My contention is
that Snouck Hurgronje’s advice to the Dutch government to distrust Teuku Umar was
influenced by Hasan Mustapa.
The ‘durian incident’ and the loyalty of Teuku Umar to the Dutch
authorities
In his letter dated 19 July 1893 (Cod. Or. 18.097 S.16.2.020-021) to Snouck Hurgronje,
Hasan Mustapa described the ‘durian incident’ of July 1893 entitled Risālah wal’ah al-
nārīn fī waq’ah al-dūrīn, the treatise on the flames of the durian incident. It was
related by Hasan Mustapa with information from an Acehnese informant. This was
the first case that Hasan Mustapa reported on, to demonstrate the serious dispute
between Teuku Umar and Teungku Amin and other Acehnese fighters. Teuku Umar
who had developed closer relations with the Dutch authorities since 1888 when van
Teijn was governor of Aceh, finally received Dutch military aid against the troops of
Teungku Amin. The durian incident shows further collusion between Teuku Umar
and the Dutch authorities before the official collaboration in September 1893 when
Teuku Umar received various privileges.
The durian incident occurred when Teungku Amin’s troops robbed followers of
Teuku Umar who passed through Chik Asan’s village and brought durians and other
fruits. The two sides then attacked each other. Teuku Umar’s followers fled to the
village of Chik Bintang and the village was burned down by Teungku Amin’s troops.
Chik Bintang complained to Teuku Umar and he eventually agreed to attack Teungku
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Amin’s troops. The troops entered the fort and were besieged by Teuku Umar’s followers
for two days but were unable to penetrate it.
Shortly after the durian incident, villages were burnt on 16 July 1893 including the
homes of Teuku Umar and his father-in-law, Teuku Nanta, who was the father of Cut
Nyak Dien. The perpetrators were Teungku Amin’s troops. Teuku Umar then retaliated
by killing nine members of the troops. Eighty people from Teungku Amin’s troops died
in the civil war, including Teuku Obeb and the son of Teungku Tanoh Abee. The com-
mander of the Great Mosque of Aceh who was on the side of the Dutch, assisted Teuku
Umar. The Dutch authorities also supported Teuku Umar by laying siege to Teungku
Amin’s troops. The two warring parties were to cease attacking each other on 17 July
1893. However, the hostilities continued with sniping from both sides. According to
Hasan Mustapa, the burning of villages was evidence of Teuku Umar’s rage towards
Teungku Amin for the death of his brother, his troops, and the burning down of his
house and that of his father-in-law’s.
The letters of Hasan Mustapa also described the civil war as destroying a custom
(inkharaqat al-‘ādah) that prohibits attacking fellow Acehnese. He felt the main
reason for the durian incident leading to war between Teuku Umar and Teungku
Amin was related to a previous robbery by Teungku Amin. This was when a group of
Teuku Umar’s female followers accompanying the bride, Nyak Ma’i, were robbed by
Teungku Amin’s troops when the group arrived at Kuta Asan, near the Dutch fort in
Peukan Bada. Fighting followed and Teungku Amin’s troops killed four women.
Teuku Umar’s followers were initially silent about the incident because he was busy pre-
paring to defend the Dutch, who were considered ‘infidels’ (bela kaphé). Teuku Umar
only raised the issue of this earlier robbery case by Teungku Amin’s troops after the
durian incident.
There were many events that provided cause for Teuku Umar to attack Teungku
Amin’s troops, such as the durian incident in early July 1893, the burning of the
houses of Teuku Umar and his father-in-law, Teuku Nanta, in mid July1893, and the
murder of his female followers and a bride a few days previously. These cases became
evidence of Teuku Umar’s closeness to the Dutch authorities. He received military aid
from the Dutch in the face of the civil war with Teungku Amin on 18 July 1893. The
Dutch government assisted Teuku Umar as part of its divisive strategy. Whilst Teuku
Umar was considered suitable enough to collaborate with Dutch military troops, he
had to prove his loyalty, and one such example was to attack Teungku Amin who was
regarded as a representative of the Acehnese troops.
The collaboration between the Dutch and Teuku Umar was also related to Snouck
Hurgronje by Hasan Mustapa in the letter of 19 July 1893. Hasan Mustapa had received
information from Teungku Brahim, an Acehnese informant, who came to his home on
the day one of Teungku Amin’s fighters was buried. He had asked Teungku Brahim about
the views of the Acehnese on the prang sabi. He replied that the Acehnese dissented on
the obligation to bathe their martyrs on the previous day. They usually consult Islamic
law books for answers. Hasan Mustapa then asked Teungku Brahim about the Acehnese
view on the civil war between Teuku Umar and Teungku Amin. Which party was con-
sidered the Muslim side? He replied that the Acehnese considered Teungku Amin as the
Muslim defender, since he did not receive Dutch military aid, unlike Teuku Umar. Hasan
Mustapa asked again, ‘Why would the government want to help Teuku Umar who
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betrayed the Acehnese?’ Teungku Brahim replied, ‘It is because Teuku Umar is loyal to
the Dutch authorities although he asked for some guarantees’ (see Appendix).
Based on information from Teungku Brahim, Teuku Umar was originally hostile
towards Teungku Amin and his troops for disturbing the peace as evidenced in
robbing the bridal party and the durian incident. However, these disputes escalated
when Teuku Umar exploited them to demonstrate his loyalty to the Dutch. He then
received Dutch military aid in the second attack on Teungku Amin’s troops. The
rumour of the treachery of Teuku Umar was circulating among the Acehnese who con-
sidered him a traitor for collaborating with the Dutch.
Rumours of the disputes were also reported by Hasan Mustapa in his next letter to
Snouck Hurgronje dated 15 August 1893 (Cod Or. 18.097 S.16.2.007-009) where he
described the complaints made to the Dutch government on the durian incident. The
first complaint came from Teuku Umar’s wife, Cut Nyak Dien, and her father Teuku
Nanta (who became a follower of Teuku Umar), that Teungku Amin had fought
them, burned their villages, and killed their people wrongfully. The second was from
Teungku Amin who considered that Teuku Umar had deviated and renounced Islam,
and followed the infidels, and if they were not opposed, they would cause misery to
most Muslims. It was said that Teungku Amin was angry and sent support to all the vil-
lages to help Muslims who were fighting Teuku Umar and the Dutch authorities.
Teungku Amin sent this letter of complaint to Teuku Umar with the ninefold seal (sikur-
euëng) that was commonly used during peace times. This was a round seal with nine
circles, inscribed with the Sultan’s name, and was usually used for important royal
letters (Alfian 1987: 40; Majid 2013: 152). Teungku Amin then sent the letter to the
Dutch authorities and the Sultan. He also attached a newspaper article about the fatwa
of the ulamas in his argument that Teuku Umar was an infidel, thus supporting his argu-
ment to oppose it. There is also evidence that this war was related to other wars taking
place throughout the Islamic world (Cod Or. 18.097 S.16.2.007-009, 15 August 1893).
Teuku Umar was therefore increasingly trusted by the Dutch government and suc-
ceeded in using this dispute with Teungku Amin as part of his strategy to demonstrate
his loyalty. He convinced the Dutch authorities that he was serious in fighting the Aceh-
nese troops represented by Teungku Amin. The Dutch needed to support Teuku Umar to
understand the regional operations of the Acehnese troops and control the Acehnese
(Kitzen 2012: 94). Meanwhile, Teungku Amin was considered to have less influence
with the Acehnese after the death of his father, Teungku Muhammad Saman Di Tiro.
He even placed his father in a posthumous position of honour in his guerrilla war.
However, he deviated from his mission to fight against the Dutch and often dismayed
the Acehnese who viewed his actions as personal vendettas (Beamer 1975: 55; Kamajaya
1981: 20, 31; Raihan 2014: 57). The durian incident and the robbery of the bridal group
were seen as Teungku Amin abusing his power.
Teuku Umar cannot be trusted
However, Teuku Umar’s dispute with Teungku Amin failed to convince the Dutch auth-
orities of his loyalty. Both Hasan Mustapa and Snouck Hurgronje believed that the
dispute was a personal issue between the discordant parties that occurred some time
ago. Since his arrival in Aceh in February 1893, Hasan Mustapa had met Teuku Umar.
INDONESIA AND THE MALAY WORLD 71
The oath of allegiance ceremony that Teuku Umar and his 15 Acehnese commanders
participated in the formal collaboration with the Dutch took place on September 1893.
Teuku Umar was trusted by the Dutch civil and military governor of Aceh, Deijkerhoff,
and he had earlier demonstrated his closeness to the Dutch during the term of the pre-
vious governor van Teijn. But, Hasan Mustapa as the Chief Penghulu of Kutaraja had his
doubts and was closely observing Teuku Umar to report back to Snouck Hurgronje in
Batavia.
Hasan Mustapa’s suspicions of Teuku Umar was more obvious in his letter dated 15
August 1893 (Cod. Or. 18.097 S.16.2.007-009). He wrote that some people praised the
response of Assistant Resident C.A. Kroesen who supported Teuku Umar with rifles,
bullets and weapons, but others saw it as a useless move. Hasan Mustapa considered
that Teuku Umar’s attitude was ambivalent because ‘thousands were the sounds of his
bullets but they missed Muslims as the target’ (bidalīl asẉāt banādiqih ulūfan walā
yuhīb aḥad min al-muslimīn). Snouck Hurgronje commented that the Dutch war
against Acehnese Muslims was similar to the civil war between the Bedouin Arabs and
the Sharif fortress in Hejaz, referring to the Saudi civil war of 1869. The Dutch authorities
continued using Teuku Umar as an intermediary despite deeming him untrustworthy.
Hasan Mustapa then insisted that Teuku Umar was dishonest and treacherous to the
Dutch, as reported by many in Aceh. This can be seen from the reluctance of Teuku
Umar to give a village that he controlled to the Dutch. HasanMustapa considered it poss-
ible that Teuku Umar had first asked permission from Sultan Muhammad Daud Syah
about it, but the Sultan personally remained silent on this case which meant he didn’t
agree.
Hasan Mustapa also asked Teungku Di Karim (Do Karim), a member of Teuku
Umar’s troops, for information on Teuku Umar. Hasan Mustapa explained in his
letter of 16 December 1893 (Cod Or. 18.097 S.16.2.011-013) to Snouck Hurgronje that
he had a visit from Teungku Di Karim who had just returned from fighting against Aceh-
nese troops. Hasan Mustapa enquired about the courage of Teuku Umar in the war.
Hasan Mustapa was probably anxious to find out more about Teuku Umar as he may
have been dubious about the latter’s allegiance to the Dutch. Teungku Di Karim
replied that it was Teuku Umar’s custom to stand and raise his sword in what was
called ‘the angry lion’ (singa marah) stance and he did this before attacking Acehnese
troops and taking 50 people as prisoners. He also often encouraged his troops by
saying: ‘Go up to the war, please. Do not die, because if we died who will fight in the
future?’. Teungku Di Karim also disclosed information about the rest of Teuku
Umar’s troops. He had only only three commanders left and he paid them as much as
300 riyals to fight for him.
Hasan Mustapa’s distrust of Teuku Umar was also buttressed by Acehnese complaints
of Teuku Umar including those in direct contact with him. Hasan Mustapa, for instance,
personally dug up secret details about Teuku Umar from one of his troopers, Chik
Bintang, on 13 June 1894. Chik Bintang said that the Acehnese were fearful of being
attacked as long as Teuku Umar held this position, presumably as a collaborator of
the Dutch. Chik Bintang stated that one of the consequences of Teuku Umar collaborat-
ing with the Dutch was that the no one could not count on the loyalty of some areas, par-
ticularly those villages upstream (ulu). These ulu villages would be inconsistently
supportive for or against the Dutch and their loyalty was therefore unreliable.
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The information from Hasan Mustapa about Teuku Umar had also been passed to
Deijkerhoff. Hasan Mustapa in his letter of 8 July 1894 described how Deijkerhoff
would ask him for information on Aceh on Friday and Sunday nights. Deijkerhoff
asked about the Aceh security situation, and on Teuku Cut Tungkōb, Teuku Umar,
Teuku Ba’it, Panglima Polém and the costs of jihad for the Acehnese. All questions
were truthfully answered by Hasan Mustapa.
One of Deijkerhoff’s important questions was about Teuku Umar who was beginning
to worry him. Hasan Mustapa’s response was drawn from his talks with the Acehnese
who praised Teuku Umar’s courage and openness. However, when Deijkerhoff asked
Hasan Mustapa for his personal opinion on Teuku Umar, his response was that as
long as Teuku Umar’s words were true, he had not done anything wrong. Deijkerhoff
then asked about Teuku Nek, an Acehnese on the Dutch side. Hasan Mustapa answered
that as long as Teuku Umar was trusted (by the Dutch), Teuku Nek would be ill or would
pretend to be ill (wa mā dāma Teuku ‘Umar musạddaq, faqad tamarraḍ Teuku Nek min
zamān). This view was similar to one that Hasan Mustapa gave in his previous letter to
Snouck Hurgronje dated 29 June 1894 (Cod. Or. 18.097 S.16.3.054-56). It showed that
Teuku Nek detested Teuku Umar and was envious of him.
Teuku Nek appeared to be envious of Teuku Umar as the latter was trusted more by
the Dutch, and he personally felt that he had helped the Dutch more than Teuku Umar. It
is said that Teuku Nek assisted the Dutch authorities before the second expedition of the
Dutch (1874–1880), after being disappointed by the Sultan for dismissing him as the head
of VI Mukim (El Munir andMuin 1983: 26). Although both Teuku Umar and Teuku Nek
were outwardly friends, they competed for the trust of the Dutch colonialists. This can be
seen in Hasan Mustapa’s letters of 9 October 1894 (Cod. Or. 18.097 S.9.1.027-029). He
said that one day Teuku Nek complained that the Dutch appreciated Teuku Umar
more than him, and that he was tired of helping the government, since he was regarded
as less worthy of consideration. Teuku Nek also felt Aceh would not see peace even in
another hundred years because government regulations were constantly changing; one
day they bring in someone and another day they bring in someone else.
Additionally, in his letters of 23 July 1894 (Cod Or. 18.097 S.16.2.046-048), Hasan
Mustapa mentioned rumours circulating among the Acehnese about Muslims who
were killed by Teuku Umar, in his support of the Dutch. One rumour was the killing
of two Muslims, namely Teuku Raja Muda Guroh and one of his followers. They were
allegedly killed because they fled from their villages to join Acehnese troops. It was
also reported that ten people fled from Teuku Umar’s village taking a large number of
rifles and bullets. However, Hasan Mustapa discounted these rumours. If they were
true, he felt, it was evidence that controlling the Acehnese was difficult as proved by
the number of weapons stolen by those who fled. But, if the rumours were false, then
that could lead to other lies. However, Acehnese troops did in fact fire on Dutch
troops. Teuku Umar was proven to have lied on this matter in that the rumour was
just an excuse to deliberately deceive the Acehnese troops who fled and took the
weapons. Hasan Mustapa received the leaked information from Acehnese informants.
This showed that Hasan Mustapa was inclined to distrust Teuku Umar although he
was unable to get to the bottom of the truth.
HasanMustapa felt that Teuku Umar now held different views compared to when they
first met. In his letter to Snouck Hurgronje of 9 October 1894, Hasan Mustapa stated that
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he had reported the information to Deijkerhoff whom he called the overlord (al-shaibah).
He had heard that Teuku Umar had advised Teuku Imeum to join the Dutch. For Hasan
Mustapa, an indication of Teuku Umar’s deceit was his failure to wage war against Aceh-
nese troops. He also felt there was no advantage for the Dutch in having Teuku Umar or
Teuku Imeum as allies.
In another letter dated 25 December 1894 (Cod. Or. 18.097 S.16.3.034), Hasan
Mustapa included his assessment of Teuku Umar that he had given to Deijkerhoff.
The latter asked Hasan Mustapa about Teuku Umar’s intention: ‘Had his heart turned
or not?’ (i.e. whether he now hated the Dutch). Hasan Mustapa replied, ‘It seems to
me that he did bad things ( jahat) for the Dutch government.’ However, this was
denied by Deijkerhoff. In addition, according to Hasan Mustapa, Teuku Umar might
well have attacked fellow Acehnese to gain honour from the Dutch. This conversation
revealed Hasan Mustapa and Deijkerhoff’s differing views of Teuku Umar.
In his next letter to Snouck Hurgronje dated 5–6 January 1895 (Cod. Or. 18.097
S.16.4.003-007), Hasan Mustapa described Teuku Umar as a person who speaks
harshly of others (kalām al-fāsid). Hasan Mustapa’s disapproving comments on
Teuku Umar were noted in many other letters to Snouck Hurgronje between 1893
and 1895. He had viewed Teuku Umar as inadequate several times. Firstly, Hasan
Mustapa doubted Teuku Umar’s reason for visiting the Muslims in Mukim VI,
which allegedly was to make peace with them (Cod. Or. 18.097 S.16.2.007-009, 15
August 1893). Secondly, Teuku Umar was considered to have evaded responsibility
in throwing the rock and then hiding the hand (yarmī al-ḥajar bi dass al-yad), by
not participating when the Dutch troops patrolled late in the night to foil robberies
and ambushes during those hours (Cod. Or. 18.097 S.16.2.015-018, 24 October
1893). Thirdly, Hasan Mustapa suggested that Snouck Hurgronje should investigate
thoroughly Teuku Umar’s hostility towards his opponents in Aceh ( fa ‘alaikum
tadqīq dabbārah Teuku ‘Umar min mabādih wa natā’ijih) (Cod. Or. 18.097
S.16.2.052-53, 4 July 1894). Fourthly, Habib Abas (son-in-law of Habib ‘Abdurrahman
al-Zahir), who visited Hasan Mustapa, suggested that the Dutch should not be involved
with Teuku Umar or be drawn into any of his activities. Another person who visited
Hasan Mustapa the following day, a man from Lam Tabah, said that Teuku Umar’s
heart changes like a weather vane (yanqalib qalbuh). According to this man, Teuku
Umar craved a medal of honour from the Dutch government (Cod Or. 18.097
S.9.2.009-011, 3 September 1894). Hasan Mustapa also mentioned that one example
of Teuku Umar’s yearning for honour, according to some, was that he personally
spread the word that he had been ordered by the Dutch authorities to reconcile with
Mukim XII and Pidie village that he had been warring with (Cod. Or. 18.097
S.16.3.026-029, 18 December 1894).
Hasan Mustapa’s wariness of Teuku Umar subsequently influenced Snouck Hur-
gronje. As a scholar who was charged by the Dutch authorities to investigate Aceh,
Snouck Hurgronje felt he could not trust any Acehnese. He had criticised Deijkerhoff’s
policy in collaborating with Teuku Umar whom he believed to be untrustworthy. He
said, ‘When Umar shakes your hand, accept his hand firmly. Use Umar where he
can be of use, but do not trust him’ (Said 1981: 171–172). This response was in
Snouck Hurgronje’s notes (1906, I: xii) to the Dutch Governor-General van der
Wijck on 18 January 1894. He believed that the Dutch alliance with Teuku Umar
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was risky (van ‘t Veer 1985: 156). That Teuku Umar was considered untrustworthy was
undoubtedly a view similarly held by Hasan Mustapa as indicated in his letters to
Snouck Hurgronje. Therefore, Hasan Mustapa’s contribution to Snouck Hurgronje’s
perspective on the Acehnese is evident.
Hasan Mustapa had long been trusted by Snouck Hurgronje as the latter claimed to
have closely known him for a dozen years from his time living in Mecca to the Dutch
East Indies. Snouck Hurgronje had a rare and high respect for Hasan Mustapa’s
reliability and talent (van Koningsveld 1990: li). His honesty was undoubted by
Snouck Hurgronje who corresponded with Hasan Mustapa over a long period of time
until his return to the Netherlands (Rohmana 2018).
Based on the information provided by Hasan Mustapa, Snouck Hurgronje had a
reliable source for his advice to the Dutch Governor-General in Batavia. Hasan
Mustapa also corresponded directly (in Malay) with Governor-General van der Wijck
on some issues. He not only supplied information and counsel to the Dutch officials
in Aceh, but also maintained constant contact with Snouck Hurgronje and other
officials in Batavia (Rohmana 2016). However, Hasan Mustapa’s letters written in
Arabic could only be accessed by Snouck Hurgronje, and the latter therefore had a critical
role in passing on the information about Aceh to the Dutch governor-general. Both
Hasan Mustapa and Snouck Hurgronje were key figures in providing information on
Aceh that was reported to the Dutch authorities.
In the context of TeukuUmar and theAcehnese-Dutchwar,HasanMustapawas deeply
involved in the politics of Aceh. His contacts with the ulamas and uleebalang, including
Teuku Umar, who at that time was on the side of Dutch government, enabled him to
collect information about Acehnese troops and assess local opinions.
Concluding remarks
I have focused on the complexity of relations between Dutch colonial officials and their
informants during the Acehnese-Dutch war, particularly between 1893 and 1895.
Hasan Mustapa, as Chief Penghulu of Kutaraja, provided much information from
local Acehnese informants. He relayed the information to local Dutch officials in
Aceh as well as his close friend Snouck Hurgronje. His letters to Snouck Hurgronje
illustrate the importance of the role of informants in the colonial bureaucracy,
especially in the Acehnese-Dutch war. He provided information about Teuku Umar
when the latter joined the Dutch side. The socio-political background of events such
as the durian incident and the dispute between Teuku Umar with a fellow Acehnese
fighter, Teungku Amin, was gathered from a number of local informants and trans-
mitted by Hasan Mustapa to Snouck Hurgronje. Hasan Mustapa’s aim was to ensure
that Snouck Hurgronje as the colonial advisor of the Dutch government, would not
be quick to trust Acehnese fighters. Informants such as Hasan Mustapa and others
in the Dutch East Indies reveal a strong power relationship as spies for colonial
officials in being able to provide crucial information for the Dutch to understand colo-
nial society and subdue the rebels. However, in the case of Hasan Mustapa and Snouck
Hurgronje, the role of the informant for the colonial official was more than a patron-
client relationship, as there was also an unusual affinity based on religious brotherhood
and a long friendship.
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Appendix
The text of Hasan Mustapa’s Risālah wal’ah al-nārīn fī waq’ah al-dūrīn, the treatise on the flames
of the durian incident. This treatise is one of Hasan Mustapa’s letters from Kutaraja, dated 19 July
1893, addressed to C. Snouck Hurgronje in Batavia. It is kept in the Snouck Hurgronje Archive in
Leiden University Library, Or. 18.097 S.16.2.020-021.
Translation
The treatise on the flames of the durian incident
Some of them [the Acehnese] said that one day in this month [July 1893], there was a group of
Teuku Umar’s people who passed through [the way]. They brought durians and many kind of
fruits. When they reached the village of Chik Asan, the people of Teuku [sic] Amin [Teungku
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Amin] robbed them off their durians and other fruits. They then attacked each other. The people
who were waylaid ran to Chik Bintang’s village. They [Teungku Amin’s troops] entered the village
and burned down the houses in the village. Chik Bintang complained to Teuku Umar who then
assembled a troop from nine teams of guerrilla fighters. They attacked 200 of Teungku Amin’s sol-
diers. Teungku Amin’s troops entered the fort. Teuku Umar’s troops then besieged it for two days.
The people who helped Teuku Umar could not assail the fort.
On Sunday, 16 July [1893], many houses in Teuku Umar’s villages were burnt, including that of
Teuku Umar and his father-in-law, Teuku Nanta [Cut Nyak Dien’s father]. They [Teuku Umar’s
troops] evacuated him to evade detection. Teuku Umar butchered with his hands nine people.
Eighty people of Teungku Amin’s troops died in this war. Among them were his brother,
Teuku Obeb, and the son of Teungku Tana Abeh [Tanoh Abee]. Meanwhile, people who
entered the [Dutch colonial] government area, the commander of the Great Mosque and his com-
munity, assisted Teuku Umar. The [Dutch] government supported him [Teuku Umar] with rifles,
bullets and weapons. When they besieged the fort [of Teungku Amin], bullets were fired from
within [the fort]. They approached to seize the fort. Finally, they arrested the people inside
[who] came out of the fort.
OnMonday morning [17 July 1893], the war ended. However, bullets fired could be heard from
both parties. Smoke also billowed from the burning villages and reeds. It seemed that Teuku
Umar’s anger was ignited by the burning houses. The tradition of the Aceh war was that those
who win would enter the village and destroy it [and it could be just be] by cutting down
banana trees or burning houses. The anger towards Teungku Amin was due to the death of his
brother [Teuku Umar’s] and his troops, and that war is a destructive custom.
Some of them [the Acehnese] said that the main reason [for the civil war] was [the incident]
shortly after a bride’s entourage of Teuku Umar’s followers passed through Luteung Manarah.
The bride’s name is Nyak Ma’i. When they arrived in Kuta Asan – which is the name of a big
tree called langsana [pterocarpus indicus] in Malay and a place where there is a fort of the
Dutch soldiers in Peukan Bada – Teungku Amin’s troops robbed [the entourage]. They attacked
each other until supposedly four females from the entourage and four people of the waylayers were
killed. They [Teuku Umar’s followers] were silent about this, because they were defending the
infidels (bela kaphe). Teuku Umar did not interfere with this case. Then there is now the
second case [the durian incident] that again displeased him.
The liars [people] said that ‘We have won the great war.’ People witnessed from the fort of Lam
Jamo and Lam Teh. Based on what I heard from their lies, the people of the Great Mosque caused
the deaths of many of Teungku Amin’s troops, while others [said that the people of the Great
Mosque] brought about the deaths of Teuku Umar’s followers. You have to hold an investigation
on the news from the inside area [Aceh palace]. I do not hear from them that there are those who
say ‘Muslims’, because the war is between themselves, and [I also do not hear] people who say ‘the
holy war’ [prang sabil] for that [civil war].
It is said that the biggest war ever was on the third day [Tuesday], 18 July [1893], in Blang and
the surrounding area. They said that Teuku Umar’s group came out. However, it was also said that
Dutch soldiers’ assistance of as many as 400 rifles, thousands of bullets, and weapons had arrived
for Teuku Umar by agreement. They slowly acted in Lam Baro. I had no measure of the number
Teungku Amin’s people who were on guard. I said with a laugh to one of the members of the Great
Mosque, ‘Yes, after you get there, you should burn a bamboo tree that makes the sound of weapons
firing.’ So that they [the Dutch soldiers] will say that the bullets and weapons were used. They will
not check it, nor will they laugh at all. He said, ‘You have thoughts like that?’ I replied, ‘Yes. It has
been shown to me, bloodstains from leech attacks. They [Teuku Umar’s troops] informed me [that
the bloodstains were] from the bullets. They also tore their [own] clothes and said that they were
dragged by the enemy.’ He laughed. He then said, ‘He [Teuku Umar] made things unusable.’
It is said that even Lam Kuta, who had just returned from Batavia, was injured in the calf of leg,
but did not die. Teungku [Brahim] today came to me. He described Engkong whose picture looks
like a youth carrying siwa-siwa [Acehnese traditional weapon]. The replacement [of his position]
will be easy. He will not disappear from your memory [because he has] bought three Aceh riyals. I
named him Teuku Obeb because today is the day of his [Teuku Obeb’s] burial.
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I said [to Teungku Brahim], ‘What do they [Acehnese] think about this prang sabil?’ He said,
‘Yes, based on the indication that yesterday they dissented with the obligation to bathe the martyrs
among them, they opened the books and got a clear exposition about the obligation to bathe the
martyr.’ I said, ‘Which side is called Muslims?’ He [Teungku Brahim] answered, ‘Teungku Amin’s
troops because they received no assistance from the [Dutch] government.’ I said, ‘Why did the
government help Teuku Umar who betrayed [the Aceh fighters]?’ He said, ‘It is said that it was
based on his obedience to the Dutch government, even though he [Teuku Umar] also asked for
help to provide assurance [security] for his wife’s brother, the son of Teuku Nanta [Cut Nyak
Dien’s brother]. Teuku [Umar] has agreed with me on the price [of payment].’ He [Teungku
Brahim] said, ‘I was bought with a rifle as guarantee.’
It is said that today Teuku Nek, two officers, and the troops of VI Mukim have come [Teuku
Umar’s troops]. The story of Engkong above, if possible, I will send it via the next train because
currently, there is limited time to ask for help. It would be good if you respond to Teungku
Brahim’s request for pomelo and sapodilla plants. He will plant them in Lam Buhok. He also
told me that you should send the reply letter to him even though [the envelope containing
Teungku Brahim’s letter] was written on my behalf. I hope that you write to them [Dutch
officials] and show the help I have provided. Don’t describe the story [of wanting to step down
from being Chief Penghulu] with my name so that they don’t mock me. You have to explain
the story about the stoppage of this work [as Chief Penghulu, without mentioning my name].
Greetings from a friend who already understands.
Kutaraja, 19 July 1893.
Haji Hasan Mustapa
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